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PART PERFORMANCE SUBSEQUENT TO DISAVOWAL OF
AN ORAL AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE OF GOODS*
BUSINESSMEN'S oral agreements for the sale of goods of substantial value
can be held legally unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.' In bargains
involving large amounts but simple terms, the parties' established pattern
of personal dealing may give rise to unwritten agreements.2 Swift, direct,
*John Thallon & Co. v. Edsil Trading Corp., 302 N.Y. 390, 93 N.E. 2d 572 (1951).
1. "A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five
hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless . . . some note
or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged
or his agent in that behalf." U.-irona SAas Acr § 4(1) (1906).
The Uniform Sales Act version has been adopted by 34 states, the District of
Columbia, Hawaii and Alaska. 1 WILLISTON, SALES iii (3d ed. 1948). Seven additional
states have similar provisions. However, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia have no corresponding statutory provisions.
See 2 ComIN, CONTRACrS § 467 ct seq. (1951) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 51, 52 (3d ed.
1948). The proposed Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1951)
retains most of the Statute of Frauds treatment of the Uniform Sales Act. See note 17
infra and text for discussion of the changes proposed by the Code.
The theory behind the original Statute of Frauds, 29 CHAS. 2 c. 3 (1677) .%as that
a writing requirement would preclude the fraud that results from collusion and suborna-
tion of perjured testimony. See, e.g., 2 CoRBm Com.-cTs § 275 (1951); Rabel, The
Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History. 63 LQ. Rav. 174, 181 (1947);
Comment, 13 Copux. L.Q. 303, 305 (1928). Application of the Statute today, when these
policies are no longer so urgent, has caused widespread and emphatic opposition from
most legal commentators. The statute has been freely criticized as "promoter of frauds"
because it often may defeat the enforcement of honest promises. For typical attitudes,
see Stephen & Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L. Q. Rnv. 1 (185) ;
Burdick, A Statute For Promoting Fraud, 16 COL. L. Rav. 273 (1916); Willis, The
Statute of Frauds-A Legal Ancchro zis-m, 3 IND. L. J. 427 (1928). See also English
Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, The Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine
of Consideration, 15 CAN. B. REv. 585 (1937). For almost the sole contemporary aca-
demic support of the Statute, see LLEWELLY'N, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 917-18
(1930). Compare, "[T]ransactions . . . would do well to be in vwiting, and . . . a rule
which presses in that direction presses well," ibid., and, "[T]he statute stands, in esence
better adapted to our needs than when it first was passed ..... [M]udern developments of
business ... confirm the policy of the statute." Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An Essay
in Perspective, 40 YA.LE L. J. 704, 747 (1931), sAth "[A]ssertions of the beneficence
of the Statute... usually betray their own superficiality.... [T]he statutory provisions
should be wholly abandoned because they increase litigation, greatly promote dishonest
repudiation, and do not greatly aid our judicial system to frustrate fraud and perjury."
Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE LJ.
821, 831 n.7, 832 (1950).
2. See Ozier v. Haines, 103 N.E2d 485 (Ill. 1952) (5,000 bushels of corn). See
also cases in note 3 infra. The business frequency of oral agreements cannot he
ascertained with any accuracy. Data on the actual conduct of business men is practically
nonexistent And even the available data fail to correlate business conduct with legal
requirements. Nevertheless, that some business men do make oral agreements is evidenced
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telephonic arrangements may be convenient, and relied on by the parties with-
out subsequent written confirmations.8 But if one party refuses to go through
with his part of the bargain, his pleading the lack of writing as a statutory
defense to an action may permit him to defeat with legal impunity the other
party's normal business expectations. 4
The Statute, however, provides certain means for its own avoidance0
Under the part performance doctrine, the most familiar of the Statute's
exceptions, a plaintiff can hold the breaching party to the full extent of his
promise if a part of the goods covered by the oral contract was taken or
paid for.6 And courts, seeking to make oral commitments binding, have
liberally applied the part performance exception.7 Thus the New York Court
by the fact that litigation over the Statute of Frauds is not uncommon. The 5TH DEc.
DiG. (1936-1946) lists about 2750 cases under the Statute of Frauds section. Of these,
nearly 1200 were concerned with sale of goods. Typically, an oral agreement is sued
upon and resisted -by the statutory defense of no writing. 21 W-sr's 5Tn DEc. Diu. 1822-
1988 (1947). See also LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 910 (1930).
For a strong industry recommendation that written contracts always be used because
they provide the only adequate protection against breach, see TExmxuz DismtinuOrOs
BuLLETIN No. 686, Dec. 5, 1946, p. 1, cited in Comment, Remedies for Total Breach of
Contract under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 YALE L.J. 1360 n.1 (1948).
3. See, e.g., Castle v. Swift & Co., 132 Md. 631, 104 AtI. 187 (1918) (telephonic
purchase of 200 cases of eggs) ; Whiteneck & Bassett v. Weaver, 139 Okla. 88, 281 Pac.
293 (1929) (telephonic sale of 100 bales of 'cotton) ; Goodwin v. Mariners' Savings Bank,
99 Conn. 169, 121 AtI. 172 (1923) (telephonic sale of 50 shares of stock).
4. It has been said that as a matter of business practice, the Statute of Frauds
defense is invoked only when a party needs a technical escape from unconscionable con-
tract terms. Social pressure of the business community may prevent invocation of the
technical defense to defeat a "fair" oral agreement. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and
Comparative Legal History, 63 L.Q. REv. 174, 187 (1947).
5. "A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of
five hundred dollars or upward shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall
accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part pay-
ment. . . ." UNIFORM. SALES AcT § 4(1) (1906).
Earnest, as distinguished from part payment, is seldom given today. I WILIsTON,
SALES § 97 (3d ed. 1948). For a discussion of part payment generally, see id. at § 98
et seq.; 2 CoRnN, CoNTRAcrs § 496 (1951).
"The fact that the statute thus expressly provided an easy method for its own avoid-
ance is strong evidence of the lack of necessity for any such statute." Corbin, The Uni-
form Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted? 59 YALE L. J. 821, 831 n.7 (1950).
6. See note 5 supra for the statutory provision. Acceptance and actual receipt are im-
posed as a dual requirement. E.g., H. W. Myers & Son v. Felopulos, 116 Vt. 364,
76 A2d 552 (1950). They need not be simultaneous, nor occur at the time of the
agreement, but the two acts must "refer to the whole contract." See 2 CoRDIN, CoX-
T-Acrs § 482 (1951). "The buyer may reject the goods though he has previously accepted
them, provided he has not as yet received them." 1 Wnlusrox, SALES § 82 (3d ed. 1948)
(emphasis added).
7. "In innumerable cases, the courts have invented devices by which 'to take a case
out of the statute.' " 2 ComIN, CoNrRAcrs § 826 (1951). See, e.g., Whiteneck & Bassett
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of Appeals in John ThaIlon & Co v. Edsil Trading Corp.8 recently held that
defendant's partial performance even after he had unequivocally repudiated
the oral bargain bound him to his full obligation under the larger agreement.0
The parties had agreed orally to the purchase and sale of a quantity of lard,
shipments to be made on written confirmations signed by the buyer. When
he had confirmed 240,000 pounds, the defendant buyer refused to confirm
more.10 The confirmed quantity was delivered and received one month later.
Plaintiff seller, alleging an oral agreement for the purchase of 440,000 pounds,
denied by the buyer, pleaded the buyer's part performance by acceptance and
receipt of 240,000 pounds as overcoming his defense under the Statute of
Frauds.1' When the court upheld a finding that the original oral agreement
was actually for 440,000 pounds, it concluded that the buyer had partially per-
formed the larger agreement within the meaning of the Statute's part per-
formance exception and held him to his oral promise to take 440,000 pounds.'-
In general, holding a party to the full extent of his obligations, whether
written or oral, may well accord with the mores of the business community. 13
v. Weaver, 139 Okla. 88, 281 Pac. 293 (1929) (plaintiff buyer's acceptance of tagged
samples held sufficient partial acceptance and receipt of goods) ; Black Beauty Coal Co.
v. Cohen, 267 Mass. 9S, 165 N.E. 878 (1929) (defendant buyer's offer to resell held
sufficient "acceptance" of goods); Harlan v. Carney, 219 Mich. 539, 139 N.V. 27
(1922) (inspection of goods and expression of satisfaction therewith by buyer held
sufficient "acceptance").
8. 302 N.Y. 390, 93 N.E. 2d 572 (1951). Desmond, J., wrote the court's opinion,
in which Conway, Dye and Froessel, J. J., joined. A separate concurring opinion was
written by Froessel, J., joined by Conway, Desmond and Dye, J.J.; Fuld, J., dissented
along with Loughran, C. J., and Lewis, J.
9. There is some authority for the view that the doctrine only applies when perform-
ance precedes repudiation. "[flf the buyer when taking part declines to take more, the
statute is not satisfied." 1 WnxisroN, SALES § 94 (3d ed. 1948). Cf. Atherton v. New-
hall, 123 Mass. 141 (1877) (buyer liable only for amount received before his "repudia-
tion"). See also Gordon v. Witty, 198 App. Div. 333, 336, 190 N.Y. Supp. 331, 382 (1st
Dep't 1921) (acceptance must be "prior to revocation"); Good v. Curtis, 31 How. Pr. 4,
11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886) (buyer liable only while contract remains "unrevoked"); Adams
v. King, 6S Okla. 190, 192, 170 Pac. 912 (1918) (buyer liable only on goods accepted
prior to his "abrogation!').
10. The defendant had signed tvo written confirmation orders for 240,000 pounds
and retained a third confirmation order for 200,000 pounds. When the price of lard
dropped substantially, defendant "announced ...that [he] would not take more than
240,000 pounds, the quantity for which [he] had signed confirmations." 302 N.Y. 390,
395, 93 N.E. 2d 572, 576 (1951).
11. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 15-18, John Thallon & Co. v. Edsil Trading
Corp., 302 N.Y. 390, 93 N.E.2d 572 (1951).
12. The partial performance consisted in the buyer's subsequent acceptance and receipt,
not in his confirmation of the lesser quantity. 302 N.Y. 390, 393, 93 N.E2d 572, 573
(1951).
13. The primary objective of the law of contracts is the performance of considered
promises. See Sharp, Pacta Stnt Servanda, 41 CoL- L. REv. 783, 784 (1941) ; Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yx.n L.J. 52, 62 (193b). And see
note 4 supra.
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But the parties in the Thallon case dealt in the shadow of the Statute of
Frauds. If the buyer after repudiating the oral agreement had done noth-
ing more, he could have escaped legal liability because the Statute's re-
quirements were not satisfied.14 And his unequivocal repudiation, relying
on his immunity under the Statute of Frauds, doubtless scaled down the
seller's business expectations. Moreover, having had advance warning before
shipment of any goods, the seller had at least three alternatives: he could have
decided to abandon the entire deal without legal recourse; he could have
attempted to force the buyer to execute a writing that would satisfy the
Statute and obligate him for the entire agreement; or he could have settled
for the sale of a smaller amount instead of the amount under the larger oral
contract. Instead he delivered in part, sat back, gambled on a lawsuit, and
won.
As an inroad on the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds, the
Thallon decision will not cut deep. Warned by the holding, future buyers will
be more circumspect. They may refuse to perform any part of an oral contract
which they could escape completely via the Statute of Frauds.', Or they may
carefully insist that the seller agree to formal rescission of the larger oral
agreement before contracting with him anew for lesser amounts. 10 Thus
the full liability imposed by Thallon can be readily finessed.
14. "Had defendant refused to take any of the lard ...plaintiff would have had no
case." 302 N.Y. 390, 395, 98 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1951) (concurring opinion).
The cases are legion where a simple oral contract is sued upon and where the plain-
tiff's sole proof is his testimony on the parol agreement. The courts are unanimous in
holding these cases unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, See, e.g., H. W. Myers
& Son v. Felopulos, 116 Vt. 364, 76 A2d 552 (1950); Webster v. Condon, 248 Mass.
269, 142 N.E. 777 (1924); In Steiner v. Am. Alcohol Co., 181 App. Div. 309, 168 N.Y.
Supp. 739 (2d Dep't 1918) the contract was held unenforceable for lack of a writing
even though the defendant's fraud caused the omission of the writing.
15. If the Thallon decision is effective, few buyers would regard part performance
as worth the risk of a liability for more than was taken. In some situations, the seller
will thus be deprived of the entire benefit of his original bargain. At least partial
performance may salvage a portion of the business deal.
16. Rescission means a mutual agreement by the parties to an existing contract to
discharge and terminate their duties under it. Courts require formality and proof of a
mutual and uncoerced desire to rescind an existing agreement, although such assent to the
rescission may be implied. But if any contractual right to further performance under
the contract continues to exist, there has been no complete rescission. "Just as in the
case of the formation of a contract, an operative agreement of rescission can be made
tacitly as well as expressly. Also it is possible to make a valid rescission even though
it is only one of the parties who has an active desire for it and even though he is
threatening a breach of his contract. If an offer of rescission is made under such circum-
stances, an acceptance of the offer completes the discharge of the existing contracts, even
though the acceptance is accompanied by feelings of regret and dissatisfaction." 5 CoRDiN,
CoNTaAcTs § 1236 (1951).
The unenforceability of a contract under the Statute of Frauds might impair its
status as an "existing contract," thus making it incapable of rescission. But the prevailing
English and American view is that the Statute affects only the "enforceability" but not the
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On the other hand, the proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act, by a blanket
restriction of liability under the part performance exception, goes too far. 7
By the terms of the Act, oral contracts otherwise valid are enforceable only
"in respect to goods for which payment has been made or accepted or which
have been received and accepted.""' Since no specific language differentiates
partial performance which has preceded disavowal of the agreement from
such performance subsequent to disavowal, both are probably intended to
be treated alike. But certainly where partial performance has preceded
repudiation, the traditional part performance exception imposing full con-
tractual liability secures parties in their business expectations. Such partial
performance is made at a time when full performance, not breach, is con-
templated by at least one of the parties, and probably reinforces his corn-
"validity" of the contract-it is a "limitation of judicial authority to afford a remedy."
Safe Deposit Co. v. Diamond Coal Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 AUt. 54 (1912). Thus, the contract
"exists" under the Statute, albeit without remedy. For full discussion, see 1 Wix.us'ro.,
SALEs § 71a (3d ed. 1948).
But the party who seeks a new contract must take care not to make any written pro-
posals to the other party which refer to the original agreement. For courts liberally
construe any writing by the party to be charged as a sufficient memorandum to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., Sennot v. Cobb's Pedigreed Chicks, 324 Mass. 9, 84
N.E2d 466 (1949) (letter of repudiation) ; Jacobson v. Hendricks, 83 Conn. 120, 75 At.
85 (1910) (letter referring to the agreement, though written to breaching party's own
agent) ; Gall v. Brashier, 169 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1948) (written reference to agreement
retained by party to be charged). Moreover, despite the literal wording of the statute,
the memorandum need only to be written, not signed. Pearlberg v. Levisohn, 112 Misc.
95, 182 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1920). For general discussion, see 2 Co.-ni, CoN'RAcTs
§ 498 et seq. (1951); 6 WL.ISTON. CONT-ACTS § 1820 ct scq. (rev. ed. 1938).
17. "A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of writing but which is valid
in other respects is enforceable ...(c) with respectto goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted." UzzIr-o= Com-
mERCLAL CODE, Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1951 draft) § 2-201 (3). This revision of
the Uniform Sales Act was prompted by conviction that some perjury would thereby b2
prevented. "No doubt this limitation was made because it has alvmys been possible for a
handy liar to testify orally that he paid a dollar on account or delivered one of the shoe-
strings, thus making it easy to defeat the real purpose of the statute." Corbin, The U:i-
form Commercial Code--Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE L.J. 821, 831 (1950).
For the statements of opponents of this provision of the Code, see Williston, Tihe Law
of Sales in The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAv. L REv. 561, 575-6
(1950) ; Corbin, supra, at 831 n.7. The latter writer, however, is a supporter of the Code
generally.
18. See note 17 supra. The effect of the Code provision is a partial repeal of the
part performance doctrine. However, the doctrine is not scuttled in its entirety. Under
the Code provision, the price of the goods taken in part performance is based on the
agreed upon price in the oral agreement. And the court is directed to apportion that
price to the amount taken. Comments to Uniform Revised Sales Act § 201 (Spring 1950
draft). If the doctrine were fully repealed, the price of the goods taken would be their
fair market value only. See Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (1913). For
criticism of this feature of the Code, see Corbin, supra note 17, at 831 n.7 ("a true ap-
portionment of the goods or the price can not be made without first proving the terms
of the contract, and having proved them the contract should be enforced in full").
1952]
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mercial anticipations that the agreement will be fully carried out.10 The part
performance exception here prevents the interposition of the no-writing
technicality from defeating the business expectation of another contracting
party.20 The Revised Act's limitation of liability in this situation unwar-
rantedly deprives parties to oral agreements of protection they had under
prior law.
However, the Act as applied to disavowal of the oral agreement prcccding
partial performance probably accords with business reality. Such disavowal
at an early moment puts all parties on notice that the agreement is not to
be performed. And the Statute of Frauds, by immunizing the disavowal,
compels the other contracting party to scale down his anticipations. As a
result, he may go through with part of the original oral agreement, rather
then exercise his business alternative of securing full performance or none
at all. This conduct is functionally equivalent .to his bargained-for acquiescence
in a formal recission of the larger oral agreement, followed by a new contract
for the lesser amount 21 Thus the Act, in effect, short-circuits the necessity for
a prior formal rescission of the oral agreement, and thus eliminates a legal
requirement that would merely formalize a tacit bargain.
19. Cf. "The part performance must be clearly evidential of the existence of a con-
tract-it must be such as would not ordinarily have taken place in the absence of a con-
tract, and therefore is not reasonably explicable on some other grounds." 2 CoRiun, CON-
TRAcrs § 430 (1951). Some courts are explicit in demanding that the defendant intend
to complete a larger contract before holding him to that larger amount. It must appear
that the buyer "acknowledged the existence of the alleged contract and that what was
done . . . was done solely with a view to its performance." Howland v. Iron Fireman
Mfg. Co., 188 Ore. 230, 323, 215 P.2d 380, 388 (1950). See also Golden Eagle Milling
Co. v. Old Homestead Bakery, 59 Cal. App. 541, 211 Pac. 56 (1922); Brister & Koester
Lumber Corp. v. American Lumber Corp., 356 Pa. 33, 50 A.2d 672 (1947).
20. The expansion of the doctrine has probably been due to the desire of the courts
to avoid such frustration of honest agreements. See note 7 supra.
21. See note 16 supra. Ordinarily it is possible for parties to mutually rescind an
agreement and in the same transaction enter into a new one. Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc. 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921). Though the issue was not discussed In the
Thallon case, a persuasive case could be made that this was the nature of the transaction
involved. The seller certainly understood at the time of the repudiation that the buyer
was terminating his obligation; when the seller nevertheless tendered the lesser quantity
of lard as per the requests of the buyer, he can be said to have impliedly accepted a new
agreement to substitute for the old.
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